Why Trump’s election setback offers little comfort to Nato or Ukraine

Democrats can control spending bills, subpoena officials and block or delay nominees. But they lack the votes to override a presidential veto, which requires two-thirds of both chambers; most ordinary Senate bills also need 60 votes to overcome a filibuster. The new majority can impede the administration, not direct its foreign policy.

Congress has already authorised $400m [€356m] a year in Ukraine security assistance for 2026 and 2027. Democrats can press for money in must-pass spending legislation, and a president cannot lawfully withhold appropriated funds for policy reasons. But presidential drawdowns from US stocks, delivery schedules and export licences remain largely executive decisions.

The limits also apply to other policy disputes. Trump replaced emergency tariffs struck down by the Supreme Court in February with a temporary global levy. When it expired on 24 July, tariffs on imports from 60 economies took effect under a different law. Congress could change the authority delegated to the president, but Trump could veto such a bill. On Iran, war powers resolutions face the same obstacle, while restrictions on war funding are politically difficult with US troops deployed. Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried oil and petroleum products equal to about a fifth of world consumption. Major disruptions can raise prices paid by Europeans, even though most of those supplies went to Asia.

Nato limits leave key choices to the Pentagon

A 2023 provision co-written by Marco Rubio, then a Republican senator from Florida and now Trump’s secretary of state, bars a US withdrawal from Nato without two-thirds of the Senate or an act of Congress. Whether that protection would withstand a president claiming withdrawal authority has never been tested in court.

The December 2025 defence law also restricts the use of Pentagon funds to reduce US forces in Europe below 76,000 for more than 45 days, remove major equipment, give up bases or hand Nato’s top command to a non-American. The Pentagon can still take those steps if the defence secretary and US commander in Europe certify the decision, provide assessments and wait 60 days. The restriction covers fiscal 2026 funds, and Congress is considering whether to extend it.

It does not determine what forces Washington sends during a crisis or whether aircraft based in Germany support European needs or operations elsewhere. Those decisions remain with the White House and Pentagon. The Pentagon’s review of US forces in Europe was due to give Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth at least four options by 6 November and finish in December. The new Congress is not scheduled to meet until 3 January, leaving Hegseth with the options weeks before a Democrat chairs a committee.

European director of the Trilateral Commission Josef Braml warned on Wednesday (4 November) that a Trump weakened at home might push harder on tariffs, Nato and Ukraine. Europe’s own choices are also pressing. The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loans favour Europe’s defence industry, but rules alone will not deliver refuelling tankers or missile stocks; those require money and years. A Congress more supportive of Nato and Ukraine could instead give European governments reason to postpone costly steps to reduce reliance on Washington. Trump’s term ends in January 2029, and the Democratic majority may last only two years. US voters focused on inflation, the Iran war and Trump—not European security.